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Introduction
Nearly thirty years ago, Robert Alexy in his book The Concept and Validity of Law as well
as in other early articles1 raised non-positivistic arguments in the Continental European
tradition against legal positivism in general, which was assumed to be held by, among
others, John Austin, Hans Kelsen and H. L. A. Hart. The core thesis of legal positivism
that was being discussed among contemporary German jurists, just as with their An-
glo-American counterparts, is the claim that there is no necessary connection between
law and morality.2 Robert Alexy has argued, however, that the law, besides consisting
conceptually of elements of authoritative issuance and social efficacy, necessarily lays a
claim to substantial correctness,3 which is derived from analytical arguments.4 Further-
more, if this claim to substantial correctness necessarily requires the incorporation of
* Postdoctoral researcher at the Renmin University of China, Beijing. The author is also working on a fur-
ther doctoral project at the Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Germany. I should like to thank Stan-
ley L. Paulson for suggestions and advice on matters of English style.
1 See Robert Alexy, Begriff und Geltung des Rechts (Freiburg/Munich: Verlag Karl Alber 1992); and its trans-
lation in English, see Robert Alexy, The Argument from Injustice: A Reply to Legal Positivism, trans. Bonnie
Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002). The earliest publication of
Robert Alexy on this subject was, however, in English twenty-nine years ago, see Robert Alexy, ‘On Nec-
essary Relations Between Law and Morality’, Ratio Juris, 2 (1989), 167–83. His first relating publication
in German followed in the next year, see Robert Alexy, ‘Zur Kritik des Rechtspositivismus’, Archiv für
Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft 37 (1990), 9–26.
2 See e. g. Ralf Dreier, ‘Recht und Moral’ (1980), in Ralf Dreier, Recht – Moral – Ideologie. Studien zur
Rechtstheorie (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag 1981), 181, 184, 186–7; his ‘Der Begriff des
Rechts’, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 39 (1986), 890; and his ‘Neues Naturrecht oder Rechtspositivis-
mus? In Erwiderung auf Werner Krawietz’, Rechtstheorie, 18 (1987), 383–4; see also Norbert Hoerster, ‘Zur
Verteidigung des Rechtspositivismus’, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 39 (1986), 2480; Alexy, ‘On Neces-
sary Relations Between Law and Morality’ (n. 1), at 167–8; and his The Argument from Injustice (n. 1), at 3.
3 See Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 1), at 3.
4 Ibid., at 20–1, 35–39.
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moral elements into law, then the ‘necessary connection thesis’, as defended by non-pos-
itivism, can be justified.
Some of the most significant objections to this sort of claim, stemming from the
Anglo-American world, are those introduced by Joseph Raz. In his ‘Reply’ to Robert
Alexy, Raz raises at least three interesting criticisms, including, first, the ambiguity of
‘legal theory in the positivistic tradition’, second, the indeterminate formulations of
the ‘separation thesis’, and, third, the necessary claim of law to legitimate authority as
a moral claim.5 As a point of departure, I will argue that Raz’s three criticisms are mis-
leading. For they do not enhance our understanding of the genuine compatibility or
incompatibility between legal positivism and non-positivism. Despite the frequently
reformulated theses of legal positivism and the various kinds of opponents responding
thereto, the essential divergence between legal positivism and non-positivism was and
remains the answer to the question of the relation between law and morality. Further-
more, I will clarify that in the strictest sense there can be three and only three logically
possible positions concerning the relation between law and morality: the connection
between them is either necessary, or impossible (i. e. they are necessarily separate), or
contingent (i. e. they are neither necessarily connected nor necessarily separate). The
first position is non-positivistic, while the latter two positions are, indeed, both posi-
tivistic, but in different forms: one may be called ‘exclusive’ legal positivism, the other
‘inclusive’ legal positivism. I will continue by showing that these three positions stand
to one another in the relation of contraries, not contradictories, and that, taken together,
they exhaust the logically possible positions concerning the relation between law and
morality, never mind the tradition or authority from which these positions are derived.
Raz mentions, however, many changeable formulations of the separation thesis, which
even leads him to acknowledge ‘necessary connections between law and morality’.6 One
who is trying to understand legal positivism would no doubt be puzzled by this claim.
Nevertheless, I will argue that this is an alternative strategy of legal positivism, and it
points to naturalistically oriented view. Although this necessary separation between law
and morality, understood naturalistically, strikes one as strengthening the separation, in
the end it leads to a weakened notion of necessity. This weakened necessary separation
thesis, however, cannot be justified through the so-called claim of the law to legitimate
authority, defended by Raz, for it is difficult to answer the question of whether a nor-
mally justified but factual authority can gain legitimate authority. Finally, the necessary
connection between law and morality in a strong sense can still be justified by the claim
of law to correctness, as per Alexy’s argument.
5 See Joseph Raz, ‘The Argument from Justice, or How Not to Reply to Legal Positivism’, in Law, Rights
and Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy, ed. George Pavlakos (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2007),
17–35, repr. in Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (first publ. 1979), 2nd edn.
(Oxford: Oxford UP 2009), 313–35.
6 Ibid., at 318: ‘So there are conceptually necessary connections between law and morality which no legal
positivist has any reason to deny.’
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Part One: The Traditions of Legal Positivism and of Non-Positivism
The debates between the two leading figures in contemporary legal philosophy and re-
lated fields might well date back to the year 1999, when Robert Alexy attended a ‘Col-
loquium on the Work of Joseph Raz’ in Bielefeld but without any direct response from
Raz. These essays were then published in 2003.7 Thereafter, Raz attended a workshop on
Robert Alexy’s work in 2004 in Belfast. There he gave voice to his relative comprehen-
sive attitude toward Alexy’s theory, while Alexy, for his part, found it necessary to give
Raz a separate reply. Both articles were published in 2007.8 There would be yet another
meeting in 2005 in Granada, specifically to take up the ‘Agreements and Disagreements’
between the two writers. As it turned out, this event took place without Raz, but he
was represented by his erstwhile Schüler Andrei Marmor.9 The line of debates moved
further, from Alexy’s side,10 but until now with no further response from Raz. The con-
troversy about the relation of law and morality has acquired through these exchanges
a ‘methodological dimension’, since Alexy and Raz disagree with one another not only
on the nature of law, but also on the nature of legal philosophy, especially its relation to
moral philosophy.11 These, however, are not to be understood as totally separate ques-
tions. Nor is it appropriate simply to move straightaway to the methodological dimen-
sion and claim that the conceptual relation is no longer of importance.
Some commentators, however, are not inclined to view positively the value or ne-
cessity of the so-called debate between these two thinkers.12 Nevertheless, the matter is
not insignificant either for Alexy or for Raz. In his new edition of The Authority of Law
7 See Robert Alexy, ‘The Nature of Arguments about the Nature of Law’, in Rights, Cultural and the Law:
Themes from the Legal and Political Philosophy of Joseph Raz, ed. Lukas H. Meyer et al. (Oxford: Oxford
UP, 2003), 3–16. See also Raz, ‘Comments and Response’, ibid., at 253: ‘I […] confine myself to reflections
on direct criticism of my work and related points. For this reason, for example, I will not comment on the
rich and suggestive paper by Robert Alexy.’
8 See Raz, ‘The Argument from Justice, or How Not to Reply to Legal Positivism’, in Law, Rights and Dis-
course: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy (n. 5), 17–35; and Alexy, ‘An Answer to Joseph Raz’, ibid., at
37–55.
9 See Robert Alexy, ‘Agreements and Disagreements. Debate with Andrei Marmor’, Anales de la Cátedra
Francisco Suárez, 39 (2005), 737–42; the immediate reply from Andrei Marmor and discussions of various
participants, ibid., at 769–93.
10 See Robert Alexy, ‘On the Concept and the Nature of Law’, Ratio Juris, 21 (2008), 281–99.
11 See Joseph Raz, ‘Can There be a Theory of Law?’, in Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal
Theory, ed. Martin P. Golding (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing 2005), 324–42; Robert Alexy, ‘The Nature of
Legal Philosophy’, Ratio Juris, 17 (2004), 156–67; and his ‘On Two Juxtapositions: Concept and Nature,
Law and Philosophy. Some Comments on Joseph Raz’s “Can There Be a Theory of Law?”’, Ratio Juris, 23
(2010), 162–9.
12 Stanley L. Paulson represents an exception, see Stanley L. Paulson, ‘A “Justified Normativity” Thesis in
Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law? Rejoinders to Alexy and Raz’, in Institutionalized Reason. The Juris-
prudence of Robert Alexy, ed. Matthias Klatt (Oxford: Oxford UP 2012), 61–111; his ‘The Very Idea of
Legal Positivism’, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft 136 (2013), 89–103; and his ‘An Issue in
Robert Alexy’s Theory of the Nature of Law’, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft 144 (2015),
179–87. Discussions by other authors see e. g. Paula Gaido, ‘The Place for Morality in Law. An Exchange
between Robert Alexy and Joseph Raz’, in Rechtsphilosophie und Grundrechtstheorie. Robert Alexys System,
ed. Martin Borowski, Stanley L. Paulson and Jan-Reinard Sieckmann (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2017),
133–44.
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(2009) after nearly thirty years, Raz revised nothing in the book but he added, as ap-
pendices, two articles, one of which is concerned with Kelsen’s special ‘Pure Theory of
Law’,13 and the other – last but by no means least – the earlier reply to Alexy.14 Moreover,
it should be emphasized that both appendices focus still on the problem of relation of
‘law and morality’, the very reference of the subtitle of his book.15 The importance of this
controversy lies furthermore in the fact that it involves the most significant legal phi-
losophers of the last century, namely Gustav Radbruch,16 Hans Kelsen,17 H. L. A. Hart,18
Lon L. Fuller, Ronald Dworkin,19 Jules L. Coleman,20 and John Finnis, each of whom
belongs either to positivistic or to the non-positivistic tradition.
I. Tradition of Legal Positivism
Actually, Raz dislikes both labels, ‘legal positivism’ and ‘non-legal positivism’. On the
one hand, he prefers only the ‘legal theory in the positivistic tradition’ rather than ‘legal
positivism’, which, he contends, is totally indeterminate and varies with the various pos-
sibilities of writers or cultures:
After all ‘positivism’ in legal theory means, and always did mean, different things to different
people. What Radbruch, one of Alexy’s heroes, meant when he first saw himself as a legal posi-
tivist and then recanted was not the same as what ‘legal positivism’ means in Britain (and now-
adays in the U. S. A. as well) among those who engage in philosophical reflection about the
nature of law. Perhaps Alexy is simply addressing himself to a German audience, and refuting, or
attempting to refute, legal theories of a kind identified in Germany as ‘legal positivism’. Perhaps,
though his references to Hart show that he does not intend it that way.21
One the other hand, he does not rely with any certainty on ‘non-legal positivism’:
I do not care whether my views are classified with legal positivism, as they commonly are, or
not. I believe that the classification of legal theories as legal positivist or non-legal positivist,
which underpins the structure of Alexy’s book, is unhelpful and liable to mislead. … These the-
ories [of Lon Fuller and of John Finnis – emphasis added], among the central examples of natu-
13 See Raz, ‘The Purity of the Pure Theory’, in his The Authority of Law (n. 5), at 293–312.
14 See Raz, ‘The Argument from Justice, or How Not to Reply to Legal Positivism’, ibid., at 313–35.
15 Ibid.
16 See Part One, I and II, especially footnotes 27, 28, 35, 46: Radbruch on legal positivism as well as on nat-
ural law theories; and Radbruch being considered as non-positivist. See also Part Three, III. 1, especially
footnotes 72, 73: Radbruch’s anti-naturalistic stance.
17 See footnote 98, and Part Three, III. 4: Kelsen being considered as normativist, or positivist without
naturalism.
18 See Part One I, especially footnote 24: H. L. A. Hart on legal positivism. See also Part Three, III. 2, es-
pecially footnote 98: Hart considering himself eventually as ‘soft-positivist’; while he still undergoes a
naturalistic strategy.
19 See Part One, II: Dworkin being considered as modern natural law theorist and/or anti-positivist.
20 See Part Three, III. 2: Coleman on the contingent connection between law and morality.
21 See Raz, ‘The Argument from Justice, or How Not to Reply to Legal Positivism’ (n. 5), at 314.
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309Non-Positivism and Encountering a Weakened Necessity
ral law theories in recent times, at the very least show the possibility of both meeting Alexy’s test
for being legal positivist theories, and being at the center of the natural law tradition.22
Still, he grants the ‘common core of the positivist tradition’, which is ‘the separation
thesis’ formulated by his erstwhile Schüler, Andrei Marmor, as follows:
[But] possibly there is a fairly important thesis which is common to all the theories within
the tradition of legal positivism. If so, then it is likely to be ‘that determining what the law is
does not necessarily, or conceptually, depend on moral or other evaluative considerations about
what the law ought to be in the relevant circumstances’. Andrei Marmor, whose formulation this
is, calls it ‘the separation thesis’, and as it is much more successful in getting at the common core
of the positivist tradition, when referring to the separation thesis without qualification it is this
I will have in mind. I believe it to be correct.23
One can easily ask, however, whether this is the one and only adequate thesis of the legal
positivistic tradition. Raz’s teacher, H. L. A. Hart, has surely distinguished between the
genuine theses of legal positivism and those theses mistakenly attributed to positivism.
Legal positivism, according to Hart’s understanding, consists at least of contentions (2)
and (3):
[…] (2) the contention that there is no necessary connection between law and morals or law as
it is and ought to be.
(3) the contention that the analysis (or study of the meaning) of legal concepts (a) worth pur-
suing and (b) to be distinguished from historical inquiries into the causes or origins of laws,
from sociological inquiries into the relation of law and other social phenomena, and from the
criticism or appraisal of law whether in terms of morals, social aims, ‘functions,’ or otherwise.24
22 Ibid., at 317.
23 Ibid., at 319. See also Andrei Marmor, Positive Law and Objective Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2001), 71.
24 H. L. A. Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation between Law and Morals’, Harvard Law Review, 71 (1958),
601–2, footnote 25 (emphasis added). With slight revision, also see H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (first
publ. 1961), 2nd edn. (Oxford: Oxford UP 1994), 302, notes for page 185: ‘Legal Positivism’: ‘[…] (3) that
the analysis or study of meanings of legal concepts is an important study to be distinguished from (though
in no way hostile to – emphasis added) historical inquiries, sociological inquiries, and the critical appraisal
of law in terms of morals, social aims, functions, & c.’
Finally, in his Postscripts, Hart is willing to restate this position with somehow new expressions, i. e. his
understanding of legal theory as ‘a descriptive enterprise’: ‘My aim in this book was to provide a theory of
what law is which is both general and descriptive. … My account is descriptive in that it is morally neutral
and has no justificatory aims: it does not seek to justify or commend on moral or other grounds the forms
and structures which appear in my general account of law.’ See Hart, The Concept of Law, ibid., at 239–41
(emphasis original).
Besides, Hart abandons eventually other theses once being assumed as ‘legal positivism’, including the
command theory of law, the theory of reduction of legal rights and powers, the legal formalism as well as
the ethical non-cognitivism. See Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation between Law and Morals’, ibid., at
602–6, 608–10, 624–6.
Li
ze
nz
ie
rt 
fü
r U
ni
ve
rs
itä
tsb
ib
lio
th
ek
 K
ie
l a
m
 0
6.
01
.2
02
0 
um
 1
8:
51
 U
hr
Franz Steiner Verlag
Wei Feng310
In this context, Hart also quotes his intellectual ancestor, John Austin:
The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another. Whether it be or be not is one
enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry. A
law, which actually exists, is a law, though we happen to dislike it, or though it vary from the
text, by which we regulate our approbation and disapprobation.25
Most notably, Hart writes in The Concept of Law as follows:
Here we shall take Legal Positivism to mean the simple contention that it is in no sense a neces-
sary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality, though in fact they have
often done so.26
By contrast with the Anglo-American counterpart, however, the German legal philos-
opher Gustav Radbruch, in his post-War period, sets out his relatively clear criticisms
directed to legal positivism as follows:
Positivism, with its principle that ‘a law is a law’ (Gesetz ist Gesetz), has in fact rendered the
German legal profession defenceless against statutes (Gesetze) that are arbitrary and criminal.
Positivism is, moreover, in and of itself wholly incapable of establishing the validity of statutes.
It claims to have proved the validity of a statute simply by showing that the statute had sufficient
power behind it to prevail. But while power may indeed serve as a basis for the ‘must’ of com-
pulsion, it never serves as a basis for the ‘ought’ of obligation or for legal validity. Obligation and
legal validity must be based, rather, on a value inherent in the statute.27
What is mainly of concern here is, in the first place, finding the core formulation(s) of
legal positivism – but not yet, at this initial stage, to criticize them. Radbruch’s formu-
lations as well as his criticisms, however, are often deemed to be merely rejoinders to
so-called ‘statutory positivism’ (Gesetzespositivismus), familiar from German publica-
25 See John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, (first publ. 1832), ed. Wilfrid E. Rumble (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge UP 1995), 157. See also Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation between Law and Morals’
(n. 24), at 596; and his The Concept of Law (n. 24), at 207.
26 Hart, The Concept of Law (n. 24), at 185–6 (emphasis added).
27 Gustav Radbruch, ‘Gesetzliches Unrecht und Übergesetzliches Recht’, Süddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung 1
(1946), 107; repr. in Gustav Radbruch, Gesamtausgabe (Collected Works), ed. Arthur Kaufmann, vol. 3:
Rechtsphilosophie III, ed. Winfried Hassemer (Heidelberg: C. F. Müller, 1990), 88; and its translation in
English, see Gustav Radbruch, ‘Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law (1946)’, trans. Bonnie
Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 26 (2006), 6 (original texts
and emphasis added).
In another post-War article, Radbruch also writes that ‘[a] law (Gesetz) is valid because it is a law (Ge-
setz), and it is a law if, in the general run of cases, it has the power to prevail. This view of a law (Gesetz)
and of its validity (we call it the positivistic theory) has rendered jurists and the people alike defence-
less against arbitrary, cruel, or criminal laws, however extreme they might be. In the end, the positivistic
theory equates law (Recht) with power; there is law (Recht) only where there is power.’ See Gustav Rad-
bruch, ‘Fünf Minuten Rechtsphilosophie’, Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung (Heidelberg, 12 September 1945); repr.
in Radbruch, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 3, ibid., at 78; and its translation in English, see Gustav Radbruch, ‘Five
Minutes of Legal Philosophy (1945)’, trans. Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson, Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 26 (2006), 13 (original texts and emphasis added).
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311Non-Positivism and Encountering a Weakened Necessity
tions.28 This species of positivism identifies law with statutes or claims that the legal
system consists solely of statutes. It is criticized by Raz in these terms.29 Nevertheless,
despite this verbal overlapping of statute and law (Gesetz und Recht) to one degree or
another, the positivists go on to claim, according to Radbruch’s understanding, an es-
sential separation between the power ‘behind the statute’ and the value ‘inherent in the
statute’, so that only the former would be decisive for the validity of law.30 To this extent,
Radbruch’s characterization of legal positivism may contain some kind of separation
between power and value of law.
Contemporary German jurists such as Ralf Dreier then go on to formulate the cen-
tral or general thesis of legal positivism as follows: ‘it is easy to draw the positivistic
consequence, that there is no necessary relation between law and morality, and the
legal obligation and moral obligation are strictly to be separated.’31 Dreier terms it the
‘separation thesis’.32 As he puts it, the ‘law’ (Recht) here is always formulated in the
sense of the positive law (das positive Recht), while ‘morality’ means what was tradi-
tionally called ‘natural law’ or, in the early modern period, ‘rational law’ and/or ‘justice’
(Gerechtigkeit).33 Norbert Hoerster, as a rare defender of legal positivism in Germa-
ny, agrees with Dreier’s formulation of the ‘legal positivistic separation thesis’, and he
adds, further, ‘that the concept of law as well as the derived concepts of legal validity,
legal obligation and legal binding force are determined as strictly morally neutral (and
not: morally affected).’34
II. Tradition of Legal Non-Positivism
When we shift from the tradition of legal positivism to that of legal non-positivism, it
is very natural to have a look at the so-called ‘natural law theories’.35 Throughout the
28 See e. g. BVerfGE 3 (1954), 225, 232: ‘value-free statutory positivism’; BVerfGE 34 (1973), 269, 286–7: ‘[A]
narrow statutory positivism opinion is being rejected. The wording supports the sense that statute and
law do in fact generally coincide, but not necessarily and always. The law is not identical with the totality
of written statutes.’ The citations of above decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court, see
Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 1), at 6, 8. An enlightening discussion about ‘Gesetzespositivismus’ in
German writings and especially concerning the so-called ‘Radbruch problematic’, see Stanley L. Paulson,
‘Statutory Positivism’, Legisprudence 1 (2007), 1–29.
29 See Raz, ‘The Argument from Justice, or How Not to Reply to Legal Positivism’ (n. 5), at 313, footnote 2.
30 See Radbruch, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 3 (n. 27), at 88; and its translation in English, see Radbruch, ‘Statutory
Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law (1946)’ (n. 27), at 6.
31 Ralf Dreier, ‘Recht und Moral’ (n. 2), at 181.
32 Ibid., at 186.
33 Ibid., at 184 (original text and emphasis added).
34 Hoerster, ‘Zur Verteidigung des Rechtspositivismus’ (n. 2), at 2481.
35 Gustav Radbruch formulates in his earlier period the doctrines of natural law theory, and eventually aban-
doned it. As he put it, ‘in all its forms [natural law] is characterized by four essential properties, though
these are differently emphasized at different times: It delivers content-determined legal value judgments.
These value judgments are according to their sources – nature, revelation, reason – universal valid and
unchangeable. They are available for knowledge. They gain priority to, when acknowledged, the confront-
ed enacted laws: natural law derogates positive law.’ See Gustav Radbruch, Rechtsphosophie (first publ. as
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history of ideas, natural law was and is deemed even today to be these theories being
attacked by legal positivists. As an instructive example, Hart considers that his prede-
cessors, Bentham and Austin, ‘condemned natural-law thinkers precisely because they
had blurred this apparently simple but vital distinction [between law as it is and law as
it ought to be – emphasis added].’36 Many modern writers go so far as to formulate the
core thesis of natural law theories in a way opposite to legal positivism, namely as the
‘necessary connection between law and morality’. Or they offer related theses,37 without
examining the profound ideas behind them, such as the ideas of ‘laws of God’, ‘laws
of nature’, ‘natural law’, ‘rational law’, ‘higher law’, and the like. This is not the place,
however, to scrutinize the greater project of the classic and/or modern traditions of nat-
ural law. Nevertheless, we can still discuss the natural law theories and other anti- or
non-positivistic positions insofar as they belong to one and the same ‘tradition’. A very
good example is Ronald Dworkin’s stance. As one of the most prominent critics of legal
positivism, Dworkin is sometimes considered as a ‘modern natural law theorist’,38 while,
at other times, he is labeled as an ‘anti-positivist’.39 What is more interesting is, however,
that Dworkin by himself refers to neither of them.
A terminological problem turns up as soon as we begin to think about how the ex-
pression ‘non-positivism’ came to be used in the first place. Chronologically, one should
say, Joseph Raz for the first time in Chapter 3 of his celebrated book The Authority of Law
first published in 1979, intentionally used the phrase of ‘non-positivist’ for the oppo-
nents of the legal positivists.40 This usage, however, did not appear again in English until
Robert Alexy published his article ‘On Necessary Relations between Law and Morality’
in 1989; Alexy, however, does not appear to be following Raz.41 By contrast, the parallel
Grundzüge der Rechtsphilosophie, 1914), 3rd edn. (Leibzig: Verlag von Quelle & Meyer 1932), 14; reprinted
in Gustav Radbruch, Gesamtausgabe (Collected Works), Vol. 2: Rechtsphilosophie II, ed. Arthur Kauf-
mann (Heidelberg: C. F. Müller 1993), 240; and its translation in English, see The Legal Philosophies of
Lask, Radbruch, and Dabin, trans. Kurt Wilk (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard UP 1950), 59–60 (For
the reader’s convenience, I have included citations throughout to the English edition of Rechtsphilosophie;
the quotations themselves, however, are newly translated by myself).
36 Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation between Law and Morals’ (n. 24), at 594.
37 Brian Bix e. g. formulates natural law theory as ‘a mode of thinking systematically about the connections
between the cosmic order, morality, and law. … Some of the modern legal theorists who identify themselves
with the natural law tradition seem to have objectives and approaches distinctly different from those
classically associated with natural law. … In fact, much of modern natural law theory has developed in re-
action to legal positivism, an alternative approach to theorizing about law’. See Brian Bix, ‘Natural Law: The
Modern Tradition’, in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, ed. Jules Coleman and
Scott Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford UP 2002), 61, 63 (emphasis added). Finally, Bix concludes that ‘ “natural
law” has, within the jurisprudential community, come to mean any theory in which moral evaluation is
considered central or necessary to either determining the content of legal rules, evaluating the legal status
of particular rules or rule systems, or the analysis of the natural law.’ See Bix, ibid., at 98–9 (emphasis
original).
38 Ibid., at 82–5.
39 See Andrei Marmor, ‘Exclusive Legal Positivism’, in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy
of Law, ibid., at 104; Kenneth Einar Himma, ‘Inclusive Legal Positivism’, ibid., at 141; Jeremy Waldron,
‘Legal and Political Philosophy’, ibid., at 356.
40 See Raz, ‘Legal Positivism and the Sources of Law’, in his The Authority of Law (n. 5), at 37, 39.
41 See Alexy, ‘On Necessary Relations Between Law and Morality’ (n. 1), at 167.
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phrase in German ‘Nichtpositivismus’ (non-positivism) was used by Alexy’s teacher, Ralf
Dreier, from 1987 on,42 and it was then adopted by Alexy himself from 1990 on.43 In the
same series of publications with Alexy, Norbert Hoerster as well as Hans-Joachim Koch
also formulated another German phase, ‘Antipositivismus’ (anti-positivism).44 After the
English translation of Alexy’s book The Concept and Validity of Law published in 2002,
‘non-positivism’ finally became widespread, both in the German- and English-speaking
worlds and far beyond.45 Notably, Radbruch is frequently considered, nowadays, as a
non-positivist.46
Robert Alexy then goes on to define the position of legal positivism and non-posi-
tivism as follows:
All positivistic theories defend the separation thesis, which says that the concept of law is to
be defined such that no moral elements are included. The separation thesis presupposes that
there is no conceptually necessary connection between law and morality, between what the law
commands and what justice requires, or between the law as it is and the law as it ought to be. …
[A]ll non-positivistic theories defend the connection thesis, which says that the concept of law is
to be defined such that moral elements are included.47
42 See Ralf Dreier, ‘Neues Naturrecht oder Rechtspositivismus? In Erwiderung auf Werner Krawietz’ (n. 2),
368–9, and especially 377, footnote 40: ‘Besides there is another way, through which the difference be-
tween positivistic and non-positivistic (nichtpositivistisch) positions in the legal science is decided, that
is, whether a necessary relation between law and morality is denied or admitted.’
43 See Alexy, ‘Zur Kritik des Rechtspositivismus’ (n. 1), at 9: ‘nicht-positivistische Theorien’ (non-positivistic
theories).
44 See Norbert Hoerster, ‘Zur Verteidigung der rechtspositivistischen Trennungsthese’, Archiv für Rechts-
und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft 37 (1990), 29, 31; Hans-Joachim Koch, ‘Zur Methodenlehre des Rechtspos-
itivismus’, ibid., at 160–1.
45 See Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 1), at 4. Other Writers, who also use phrase as ‘Nichtpositivis-
mus’ or ‘non-positivism’, are among others only to be mentioned here: Ulfrid Neumann, ‘Positivistische
Rechtsquellenlehre und naturrechtliche Methode. Zum Alltagsnaturrecht in der juristischen Argumenta-
tion’, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft 37 (1990), 141–51; Raz, ‘The Argument from Justice,
or How Not to Reply to Legal Positivism’, in Law, Rights and Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert
Alexy, ed. George Pavlakos (n. 5), 17–35; Stefano Bertea, ‘How Non-Positivism Can Accommodate Legal
Certainty’, ibid., at 69–82; Stephen Perry, ‘Beyond the Distinction between Positivism and Non-Positiv-
ism’, Ratio Juris, 22 (2009), 311–25; Eugenio Bulygin, ‘Alexy Between Positivism and Non-positivism’, in
Neutrality and Theory of Law, ed. Jordi Ferrer Beltrán et al. (Dordrecht: Springer 2013), 49–59; Paulson,
‘An Issue in Robert Alexy’s Theory of the Nature of Law’ (n. 12), 179–87; Volker Haas, ‘Der nichtpositiv-
istische Rechtsbegriff von Robert Alexy’, Rechtsphilosophie 3 (2017), 311–31; Júlio Aguiar de Oliveira, ‘Be-
yond Positivism and Non-Positivism’, in Rechtsphilosophie und Grundrechtstheorie. Robert Alexys System
(n. 12), 145–60.
46 See Robert Alexy, ‘A Defence of Radbruch’s Formula’, in Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Le-
gal Order, ed. David Dyzenhaus, (Oxford/Portland: Oregon 1999), 15–39; also see Paulson, ‘Statutory
Positivism’ (n. 28), at 5, 20, 27; his ‘Ein ewiger Mythos: Gustav Radbruch als Rechtspositivist’, Juristen-
zeitung, 63 (2008), 105–15; and his ‘Zur Kontinuität der nichtpositivistischen Rechtsphilosophie Gustav
Radbruchs’, in Die Natur des Rechts bei Gustav Radbruch, ed. Martin Borowski and Stanley L. Paulson
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2015), 151–182; Martin Borowski, ‘Begriff und Geltung des Rechts bei Gustav
Radbruch – Gegen die These seiner naturrechtlichen Bekehrung’, ibid., at 230–65.
47 Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 1), at 3–4 (emphasis original).
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What I would like to examine, below, is therefore the controversy between this non-pos-
itivistic connection thesis along with the various positivistic theses. One will quickly
discover that the phrase ‘necessity’ occurs repeatedly in all the various theses from both
camps, non-positivism and positivism. Thus, the basic positions cannot be determined
without close scrutiny of the notion of necessity.
Part Two: The Relation of Law and Morality: Three Basic Positions
Supposing that the notion of necessity, taken here as a point of departure, is only un-
derstood on the strictest reading, namely analytical necessity, we can then distinguish
between four relations, namely: necessary connection, necessarily no connection, and
no necessary connection, and not necessarily no connection between law and morality.
Furthermore, we can characterize these basic positions on the concept of law with the
help of modal logics.
The position of legal non-positivism says that law and morality are necessarily con-
nected, which can be symbolized as ‘□I’. According to modal logic, it is not difficult to
determine that this legal non-positivistic position implies, furthermore, that the con-
nection between law and morality is also possible, which can be symbolized as ‘¬□¬I’.48
The position of exclusive legal positivism says that law and morality are necessarily
separated (‘□¬I’). It is, once again, not difficult to determine that this exclusive positiv-
istic position implies, furthermore, that the separation between law and morality is also
possible (‘¬□I’).49
Now the above four statements together – necessary connection, necessary separa-
tion, possible connection, and possible separation between law and morality – can be
construed in terms of the so-called ‘modal logical square’. In the frame of this ‘square’,
we can prove that the logical relation of the necessary connection (‘□I’) and necessary
separation (‘□¬I’) is not contradictory; they stand to each other merely as contraries,
to wit: They cannot be both true, although they can be both false at one and the same
time; in other words, at least one of them is to be proven as false.50
48 It is equivalent to use ‘◇I’, but for convenience here I choose to only use the modal operator of necessity
‘□’ combining with the negation operator ‘¬’.
49 Or equivalently as ‘◇¬I’.
50 The contrary (as well as sub-contrary) relations in the frame of various kinds of ‘logical squares’ would
better be proven, firstly in analogous to the ‘categorical statements’ with quantifiers, and secondly with
the help of the Venn’s diagrams:
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On the basis of these four statements, furthermore, we talk about the last two state-
ments in terms of a conjunction, which can be symbolized as ‘¬□¬I ^ ¬□I’. That is
to say, law and morality are not necessarily separate (or possible connected) as well
as not necessarily connected (or possible separate). Here I suggest, following Robert
Alexy,51 that this conjunction of last two statements can be construed as an independ-
ent, frequently discussed position of ‘inclusive legal positivism’, which says that the
connection of law and morality is possible but not necessary, i. e. simply contingent.
What is more significant, we can prove that the logical relations of two of the three po-
sitions – necessary connection, necessary separation (or impossible connection), and
contingent connection – are not contradictory; again, they stand to each other merely
as contraries.52
(i) Supposing they are both true,
It is presupposed that there are F, which differs from Quine’s opinion on circumstances ‘where there are
no F’, see W. V. O. Quine, Methods of Logic (first publ. 1950), revised edn. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Wilson 1959), 69–72.
Then ‘all F are G’ and ‘all F are not G’ cannot be both true.
(ii) Supposing they are both false,
Then ‘all F are G’ and ‘all F are not G’ can be both false.
Therefore, they are contrary to each other.
Analogously, presupposing that there are laws, we can say that the assertion ‘necessarily law incorporates
morality’ and the assertion ‘necessarily law incorporates no morality’ cannot be both true, although they
can be both false; in other words, they are in contrary relation to each other.
Furthermore, presupposing that there are laws, we can prove that the assertion ‘it’s not necessary that law
does not incorporate morality’ and the assertion ‘it’s not necessary that law incorporates morality’ can be
both true, although they cannot be both false; in other words, they are in sub-contrary relation to each
other.
51 See Alexy, ‘On the Concept and the Nature of Law’ (n. 10), at 286, footnote 7; and his ‘Law, Morality, and
the Existence of Human Rights’, Ratio Juris, 25 (2012), 4.
52 Since we have already proved that the legal non-positivism and the exclusive legal positivism are contrary
to each other (n. 50). Let us prove further the logical relation of the inclusive legal positivism (‘¬□¬I ^
¬□I’) and the legal non-positivism (‘□I’) as follows:
(i) Supposing they are both true, we can then prove the conjunction of them as (¬□¬I ^ ¬□I) ^ (□I)
↔ ¬□¬I ^ ¬□I ^ □I ↔ ¬□¬I ^ (¬□I ^ □I), which is definitely false. This result means that they
cannot be both true.
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Therefore, we can illustrate their relations as follows:
¬□¬I ˄ ¬□I 53
One may well doubt whether the position of inclusive legal positivism can be character-
ized as a disjunction (‘¬□¬I ˅ ¬□I’), rather than as the conjunction suggested above.
Law and morality are, so to speak, either not necessarily separate (or possible connect-
ed) or not necessarily connected (or possible separate). This needs to be considered in
detail. In the frame of the ‘modal logical square’ we can determine once again that the
possible connection (‘¬□¬I’) and the possible separation (‘¬□I’) are in a sub-con-
trary relation to each other: They can be both true, while cannot be both false; in other
words, they stand in a disjunctive relation to each other. Therefore, their disjunction
(ii) Supposing further they are both false, we can then prove the conjunction of their respective negations
as ¬(¬□¬I ˄ ¬□I) ˄ ¬(□I) ↔ (□¬I ˅ □I) ˄ ¬□I ↔ (□¬I ˄ ¬□I) ˅ (□I ˄ ¬□I) ˅ (□¬I ˄
□I ˄ ¬□I), which is not definitely false. This result means they can be both false.
Therefore, the inclusive legal positivism and the legal non-positivism are contrary to each other.
The logical relation of the inclusive legal positivism (‘¬□¬I ˄ ¬□I’) and the exclusive legal positivism
(‘□¬I’) can be proven in the analogous way as follows:
(i) Supposing they are both true, we can then prove the conjunction of them as (¬□¬I ˄ ¬□I) ˄ (□¬I)
↔ ¬□¬I ˄ ¬□I ˄ □¬I ↔ (¬□¬I ˄ □¬I) ˄ ¬□I, which is definitely false. This result means that
they cannot be both true.
(ii) Supposing further they are both false, we can then prove the conjunction of their respective negations
as ¬(¬□¬I ˄ ¬□I) ˄ ¬(□¬I) ↔ (□¬I ˅ □I) ˄ ¬□¬I ↔ (□¬I ˄ ¬□¬I) ˅ (□I ˄ ¬□¬I) ˅
(□¬I ˄ □I ˄ ¬□¬I), which is not definitely false. This result means they can be both false.
Therefore, the inclusive and the exclusive legal positivism are contrary to each other.
53 One may like to substitute the variable ‘I’ with ‘¬I’, then the illustration would change into the following:
Nevertheless, no essential difference emerges. There are still the same three positions, since ‘□(¬I)’ is
equivalent to ‘□¬I’ (exclusive legal positivism), ‘□¬(¬I)’ equivalent to ‘□I’ (legal non-positivism), and
‘¬□¬(¬I) ˄ ¬□(¬I)’ equivalent to ‘¬□I ˄ ¬□¬I’ (inclusive legal positivism). More importantly, they
are still in contrary relations to each other.
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(‘¬□¬I ˅ ¬□I’) is a tautology, and it is always to be proven as true. In this situation,
we could have a three-fold set of considerations.
(i) Whether is it possible to assert the possible connection thesis only (‘¬□¬I’), but
not to acknowledge the possible separation thesis at the same time (‘¬(¬□I)’)?
The latter means, however, eventually accepting the necessary connection thesis
(‘□I’), i. e. the position of legal non-positivism, which would even imply the for-
mer (‘¬□¬I’), as we have said above.
(ii ) Whether, turning things around, is it possible to assert solely the possible separa-
tion (‘¬□I’), but not to acknowledge the possible connection at the same time
(‘¬(¬□¬I)’)? The latter means, however, eventually accepting the position of
necessary separation (‘□¬I’), i. e. the position of exclusive legal positivism, which
would even imply the former (‘¬□I’), as we have stated above.
(iii) The last possibility is to assert both of the possible connection thesis (‘¬□¬I’) and
the possible separation thesis (‘¬□I’). This is, however, nothing other than their
conjunction (‘¬□¬I ˄ ¬□I’), i. e. the position of inclusive legal positivism as we
have suggested above.
After all these considerations, we can conclude here: (i) There are in the end three and
only three logically possible positions concerning the relation of law and morality, i. e.
legal non-positivism, which insists upon the ‘necessary connection thesis’, the exclusive
legal positivism, which claims the ‘necessary separation thesis’, and inclusive legal positiv-
ism, which relies on the ‘contingent connection thesis’. (ii) The three positions altogether
exhaust the logically possible relations between law and morality, that is to say, any other
suggestion would be reducible to one or another of these three positions. (iii) The logical
relations between every pair of these three positions stands in the relation of contraries,
that is, each pair of the positions, namely legal non-positivism, exclusive legal positiv-
ism, and inclusive legal positivism cannot be both true, although they can be both false.
Therefore, one can arrive at only a single position consistently, and in order to justify
one’s position, the task is presented of defeating the claims of both of other two positions.
Therefore, the reply from Raz can only speak to a single position. It cannot speak
to two positions, that is to say two different forms of legal positivism. Where Alexy is
concerned, it does not suffice for him to refute a single position; he must defeat both
forms of legal positivism. There are many misleading ‘traps’ in the debate between Alexy
and Raz. The opponents whom Alexy presupposes are for the most part the inclusive
legal positivists, who insist that ‘there is no conceptually necessary connection between
law and morality’.54 But this thesis is in fact rejected by Raz. Therefore, the inclusive
legal positivism whom Alexy opposes is not the same as the exclusive legal positivism
defended by Raz. In the end, even if Alexy’s non-positivism can survive the challenge
presented by inclusive legal positivism, we are not yet in a position to take a judgment
on the debate between Alexy and Raz’s exclusive legal positivism.
54 Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 1), at 3, 21, 22.
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Part Three: The Weakened Necessity of Separation between Law and Morality
I. Notions of Necessity
The controversies between legal non-positivism and legal positivism, as well as the de-
bates within the legal positivist tradition, do not allow simplification in terms simply of
the logical possibilities at hand. The modality of necessity plays a significant role in the
discussion about the relation of law and morality. It is not only, at least not always, to be
considered simply as a modality, but as a more profound notion in relation with other
fundamental categories such as universality, truth, and causality. To this extent, I would
like to shed some light on a few more sophisticated disputes about the notion of ‘neces-
sary’, i. e. a clarification comprising at least six variants as follows:
(1) Necessity as pure coercion, or ‘coercive necessity’, which is opposite to the volition
or motivation of the subjects or agents.55
(2) Necessity as relation of consequent to antecedent in the propositional logic, or
‘necessary conditions’. As rule of reference, it is necessary that if the antecedent is
true, then the consequent is true. According to Immanuel Kant, however, this is
only a ‘formal necessity’.56
(3) Necessity as predestination according to (the law of) God, ‘laws of nature’, etc.,
which essentially combines coercion and the form of lawfulness (law-likeness, ‘Ge-
setzlichkeit’).57 Hence, it is said that ‘all the realities are necessary’.58
(4) Necessity as the relation of means to end, or ‘teleological necessity’, in which the
end would, once again, be ‘laws of nature’ or simply the practical purposes of some
agent.
(5) Necessity as causal truth according to natural scientific causal explanation, or ‘nat-
ural necessity’, ‘causal necessity’. It could be further classified into three groups:
(i) The blind,59 causal-mechanical necessity as ‘predestination’, once again accord-
ing to the ‘natural law’ or to the ‘rational law’. This is the theory of rationalism,
be it skeptical (Descartes) or dogmatic (Spinoza, Wolf), both of which are re-
jected by Kant.60
55 See Aristoteles, Phys. IV, 8, 215 a 1 below; Eth. Eud. II, 8, 1224 b 12 below, quoted from Ursula Wolf, ‘Not-
wendigkeit I’, in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, Band 6, ed. Joachim Ritter et al. (Basel: Schwabe
Verlag 1984), 948.
56 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag 1993), B 279; and its translation
in English, see his Critque of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge
UP 1998), 329.
57 See Heraklit, VS 22 A 5, 8; and Parmenides, VS 28 B 8, 30, quoted from Ursula Wolf, ‘Notwendigkeit I’
(n. 55), at 946–7. See also W. Schulz: Der begriffene Gott. Neue Rdsch. (1977) 546 below, quoted from
Dieter Wandschneider, ‘Notwendigkeit III 6’, ibid., at 973.
58 B. Spinoza, Ethica 1, prop. 29. 35. Opera, hg. C. Gebhardt 2, 70. 77, quoted from Dieter Wandschneider,
ibid., at 973.
59 See Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (n. 56), at B 280; see also his Critque of Pure Reason (n. 56), at 329–30.
60 Ibid.
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(ii) Necessity as customary conjunction between natural events known only by
experience according to David Hume,61 or, as Kant reads it, ‘the illusion of ne-
cessity’ (Schein der Notwendigkeit).62 Kant names it as the ‘subjective necessity’
in relation to empirical universality.63 Hume is one of the pioneers in the Eng-
lish-speaking world who takes a standpoint of skeptical empiricism concerning
the notion of ‘necessary connection’, and he insists that this notion of causality
is only a customary, habitual association, which is based in the end on empiri-
cal knowledge. This understanding of the necessary connection introduced by
Hume still prevails, one would say, in the English-speaking world.
(iii) The objective necessity presupposing the concept of cause as an a priori con-
cept according to Kant’s transcendental philosophy, or strict necessity in rela-
tion to strict universality.64 By contrast to the notion of blind necessity, Kant
understands the causality of nature as ‘the connection in the sensible world
of one state with a preceding state on which it follows according to a rule.’65 In
continental Europe, the understanding of necessary connection is on the most
part in Immanuel Kant’s sense. Perhaps there was and still is a deep controver-
sy between Continental and English philosophies. However, this culture-ori-
ented understanding is too simplified, and it cannot explain the general influ-
ence of natural science and the positivistic standpoint either in Continental
Europe or in English-speaking world. According to Kant, the notion of neces-
sity, joined with that of universality, is one of the characteristics of so-called
‘causality’. In order to refute the notion of ‘subjective necessity’ assuming to be
held by Hume and others, Kant writes:
61 See David Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (first publ. as Philosophical Essays con-
cerning Human Understanding, London: Millar 1748), final edn. in David Hume, Essays and Treatises on
Several Subjects, Vol. II (London: Cadell, Donaldson and Creech 1777): ‘This influence [of volition over
the organs of the body], we may observe, is a fact, which, like all other natural events, can be known only
by experience’ (E 7. 10, emphasis added); ‘[W]e only learn by experience the frequent Conjunction of ob-
jects, without being ever able to comprehend anything like Connection between them’ (E 7. 21, emphasis
original); ‘But when one particular species of event has always, in all instances, been conjoined with an-
other … [w]e then call the one object, Cause; the other, Effect’ (E 7. 28, emphasis original); ‘We suppose,
that there is some connexion between them; some power in the one, by which it infallibly produces the
other, and operates with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity.’ (E 7. 28, emphasis added)
62 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (n. 56), at B 20; see also his Critque of Pure Reason (n. 56), at 146: ‘appear-
ance of necessity’.
63 See Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (n. 56) at B 5, 127, 238, 788, 792; see also his Critque of Pure Reason
(n. 56), at 138, 225, 307, 654, 656. Besides, see Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Meta-
physik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag 2001), IV 257, 277; see
also his ‘Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that will be able to come forward as science (1783)’, trans.
Gary Hatfield, in his Theoretical Philosophy after 1781, ed. Henry Allison et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP
2002), 54–5, 73–4.
64 See Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (n. 56), at B 183, 184, A 189, B 238–248, 266; and his Critque of Pure
Reason (n. 56), at 275–6, 304, 307–12, 321–2. See also his Prolegomena (n. 63), at 260, 310, 312; and his ‘Pro-
legomena’ (n. 63), at 57, 103–4, 105.
65 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (n. 56) at B 560; also his Critque of Pure Reason (n. 56), at 532.
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Experience never confers on its judgments true or strict, but only assumed and comparative
universality, through induction. … There is no exception to this or that rule. … Necessity and
strict universality are thus sure criteria of a priori knowledge, and are inseparable from one
another.66
Indeed, the very concept of a cause so manifestly contains the concept of a necessity of connec-
tion with an effect and the strict universality of the rule.67
(6) Finally, there is necessity as analytical truth in intensional modal logic, according
to possible worlds semantics, or ‘analytical necessity’.68 It is said that ‘something
cannot be otherwise’ and that ‘something is always so and so’.
In one of his criticisms against Raz, with a direct reply by Marmor, Alexy introduces a
classification of necessity as used by various legal philosophers into at least six groups.
Those especially remarkable notions are (i) the ‘natural necessity’ as mentioned by Hart,
(ii) the empirical necessity and (iii) the logical necessity assumed to be used by Raz, as
well as (iv) the ‘practical necessity’ e. g. in the context of the Radbruch’s Formula. Be-
sides, Alexy also emphasizes (v) the universalistic, essentialistic ‘necessary properties’
of some objects such as law, or ‘nature’ of law; and (vi) ‘necessary connections directly
related to the content’ of some objects such as law.69 These considerations are of course
helpful when we engage in the concrete analysis of various positions of legal theorists,
to which we shall turn below.
II. Strategies to Understand the Natural Necessity:
Supra-Naturalism, Naturalism, and Anti-Naturalism
After scrutinizing the notions of necessity in their general philosophical background, it
is clear that the concept of nature is actually implied in notions of necessity. One possi-
ble concept of nature is the ‘law of nature’ or ‘natural law’, and it could means either pre-
destination or teleological understanding of nature, but both entail the supra-naturalis-
tic notion of necessity. The other possible concept of nature is the natural necessity, and
it could be understood by following either a naturalistic or an anti-naturalistic strategy.
Naturalism in philosophy is too complicated to lend itself to characterization in terms
of a single thesis. Nor is there a well-founded notion of naturalism in legal philosophy.
Here it is not important whether the naturalistic understanding of necessity is or not
66 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (n. 56), at B 3–4; also his Critque of Pure Reason (n. 56), at 137–8 (emphasis
original).
67 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (n. 56), at B 5; also his Critque of Pure Reason (n. 56), at 138.
68 See Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and Necessity. A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic (Chicago, Illinois:
The University of Chicago Press 1947), 7–13; See also Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (first publ.
Dordrecht, Netherlands and Boston: D. Reidel Publishing 1972), 2nd edn. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1980),
38–9.
69 See Alexy, ‘Agreements and Disagreements. Debate with Andrei Marmor’ (n. 9), 737–42, 786.
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in accordance with one or another of the philosophers who openly declare themselves
as naturalistic. When here a naturalistic reading, strategy or tendency is mentioned, it
focuses only on the way of understanding and explanation of the very conception of
(natural) necessity. It is also partly due to the central or unavoidable status of necessity
both in natural sciences and in practical philosophy. As an example of a naturalistic ex-
planation of the natural necessity, one can quote the following paragraphs:
The motivation in early modern to the self-reference of subjectivity found already its mature
expression in the experimental natural research of Galileis. The experiment to some extent has
been the reenactment of the objective natural necessity through the subject, in which this ‘op-
erationalization’ of nature can be appropriately categorized only with help of the mathematical
functioning concepts and then justified Galileis’ belief that the book of nature were written in
the mathematical letters. This mathematical conception of natural necessity, with the purpose of
possible control of the nature, becomes the leading intention of the modern physics. …
Descartes insists ontologically the conception of the continuous determination in the field of
physical extensive beings; things, plants, animals, as well as human organism, according to Des-
cartes, all function with blind, causal-mechanical necessity. At the meantime, a conception of na-
ture has widespread, according to which although the nature is teleological constructed, it should
not prescript the end by its self. This problem, after its radicalization by Kant, influenced the
understanding of nature until present.70
Furthermore, it is emphasized that the naturalistic strategy or understanding of natural
necessity is definitely a weakened notion (5.ii) of necessity. Nevertheless, there could
also be supra- and/or anti-naturalistic understanding of natural necessity.
III. The Practical Significance for the Concept of Law and Its Relation to Morality
My concern, then, is over the practical significance of the notions of necessity for our
discussion of the relations of necessary, not necessary, or necessarily no relation as these
relations address the tie between law and morality. Although in the strictest notion (6)
of analytical necessity, there are three and only three logically possible positions con-
cerning the relation of law and morality, the notions of necessity would probably vary
with different writers. In this context, the questions could be reformulated as follows:
Which notion or notions of necessity ought a legal philosopher to bear in mind? Which
strategy or strategies would the legal philosopher choose in order to uphold the position
or positions concerning the relation of law and morality that he or she defends? In order
to avoid the indeterminacy of formulations that are peculiar to individual writers and to
make one’s notion of necessity as explicit as possible, I will analyze one’s attitude, at first
70 See H. Blumenberg, Säkularisierung und Selbstbehauptung (1974); E. Husserl, Die Krisis der europ. Wiss.
und die transzendentale Phänomenol. § 9. Husserliana 6 (Den Haag 1962), 20–60; Cassirer, Das Erkenntnis-
problem 1 (31922, ND 1974), 387–402; Descartes, Principia philos. 4, 188 f. AT 8/1, 315 below, quoted from
Dieter Wandschneider, ‘Notwendigkeit III 6’ (n. 57), at 972–3 (emphasis added).
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glance (prima facie), as he or she commits oneself to one or another of the three basic
positions mentioned above.
1. Necessary Connection between Law and Morality
(natural law theorists, Radbruch, Alexy)
All the non-positivists insist on a necessary connection of law and morality (‘□I’). This
is true, as well, of the natural law theories. One may speculate that they were perhaps
sharing a ‘naturalistic’ strategy with an eye to understanding the necessity of nature, and
even going so far as to emphasize that the notion of necessity is (1) coercive, (2) pre-
destinate, (4) teleological, and/or (5.i) blind to nature itself.71 But, of course, this is not
what ‘naturalism’ means as it is understood currently. Rather, in the natural law tradition
a supra-naturalistic strategy was adopted in order to understand nature, the requirement
of which is so rigorous, but at the same time can hardly be justified.
The legal non-positivists as such, sans these profound ideal backgrounds, hold un-
doubtedly to a strict notion of necessity. Firstly, the notion (6) of analytical necessity is
attractive to them. To justify the analytical or conceptually necessary connection of law
and morality, however, one needs always to rely only on analytical arguments without
recourse to empirical or normative arguments.
One of the most prominent legal philosophers among those who are not favorably
disposed to empirical arguments or naturalistic strategies for the understanding of law
is Gustav Radbruch. In his earlier period, he differentiates the value-relating constituted
concept of law to the value-blind, natural concept of law as follows:
The law is human product, and can like each human product only be understood from its idea.
… The desk is a device to be seated, for those who sits on it. … A natural science of crime,
71 In his criticisms against ‘natural law’, Jeremy Bentham comments that ‘[t]he law of nature is a figurative
expression, in which nature is represented as a being, and such and such a disposition is attributed to her,
which is figuratively called a law. In this sense, all the general inclination of men, all those which appear to
exist independently of human societies and from which must proceed the establishment of political and
civil law are called laws of nature.’ See Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of Legislation, ed. C.K. Ogden (first
publ. 1931), 2nd edn. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1950), 82–3 (emphasis original). It seems that
Bentham considers the natural law theory as a ‘naturalistic’ one.
In the contrary, he admits only that ‘[w]hat is natural to man is sentiments of pleasure or pain, what are
called inclinations. But to call these sentiments and these inclinations laws, is to introduce a false and
dangerous idea. It is to set language in opposition to itself; for it is necessary to make laws precisely for
the purpose of restraining these inclinations.’ See Bentham, ibid., at 83 (emphasis original). In another
much more widespread paragraph against natural law theories, Bentham writes that ‘[a] great multitude
of people are continually talking of the Law of Natural; and then they go on giving you their sentiments
about what is right and what is wrong. … Instead of the phrase, Law of Nature, you have sometimes, Law
of Reason, Right Reason, Natural Justice, Natural Equity, Good Order. … On most occasions, however,
it will be better to say utility: utility is clearer, as referring more explicity to pain and pleasure.’ See Jeremy
Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Printed in the year 1780, and now
first published. London: Printed for T. Payne, and Son 1789) 13, note b. 6–7 (emphasis original). These
paragraphs show at least that natural law theories could not sincerely be naturalistic-oriented.
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which the criminal anthropology quests to be, is only possible, if one would before that substi-
tute the value-relating legal concept of crime with a natural concept of crime. It would be a miracle
beyond all miracles, a not expectable pre-established harmony of two fundamentally different per-
spectives if a value-relating constituted concept, such as that of law or that of crime, could be
made to coincide with a natural concept acquired from a value-blind perspective.72
Following neo-Kantian doctrine, Radbruch then rejects ‘the positivism, which derives
from something’s being existent […] to something ought to be.’73 In this sense, it is said
that Radbruch, already in his earlier period, criticized ‘positivism qua naturalism’.74
Nevertheless, Robert Alexy is probably the first writer who tries intentionally to in-
troduce analytical arguments in support of the conceptually necessary connection of
law and morality, i. e. the argument from law’s claim to substantial correctness.75 Origi-
nally, this argument is adopted from the linguistic philosophy, which says that the con-
tent of one speech art, i. e. an utterance as behavior, must be in accordance with its claim,
explicitly or implicitly, to correctness of its content.76 If the agent does not rise this claim
to correctness, or the agent even explicitly claimed his or her behavior to be wrong, then
he or she would make utterance with ‘conceptual defect’ in a broad sense, i. e. ‘a perform-
ative contradiction’.77 ‘Performative utterances’, which is first used by John L. Austin, is
analogous to the phase ‘operative part of a legal act’ used by lawyers.78 Reversely, Alexy
incorporates this kind of claim of speech acts into the conceptual elements of the law,
72 Radbruch, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 2 (n. 35), at 227; and its translation in English, see The Legal Philosophies
of Lask, Radbruch, and Dabin (n. 35), at 51–2 (emphasis added).
Radbruch maintains the distinction between nature, value, culture and religion as follows: ‘Nature and
value, and over the cleavage between them there are two connections: the never accomplishable bridge
of culture, and the in every moment to the goal flapping wings of religion.’ See Radbruch, Gesamtausgabe,
Vol. 2 (n. 35), at 226; and its translation in English, see The Legal Philosophies of Lask, Radbruch, and Dabin
(n. 35), at 51.
73 See Radbruch, Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 2 (n. 35), at 230; and its translation in English, see The Legal Philoso-
phies of Lask, Radbruch, and Dabin (n. 35), at 53: ‘The kantian philosophy had taught us about the impos-
sibility to derive from what is the case to what is valuable, what is right, what ought to be. Anything is never
soon right just because it is or because it was, or even because it will be the case. This results to rejection
to the positivism, which derives from something being existent, the historism, which from something
been existed, and the evolutionism, which from something will be existent, to something ought to be.’
(emphasis original)
74 See Paulson, ‘Statutory Positivism’ (n. 28), at 12–7. By ‘naturalism’ Paulson means ‘the view that everything
is a part of nature, in other words, a part of the world of space and time’, and according to his research,
‘Radbruch gives expression to his broad-based anti-naturalist stance’, ibid., at 12–3. See also his ‘Zur Kon-
tinuität der nichtpositivistischen Rechtsphilosophie Gustav Radbruchs’ (n. 46), at 158–64.
75 See Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 1), at 4, 35–9.
76 Ibid., at 35–6.
77 Ibid., at 38, footnote 66. The analysis of ‘performative contradiction’, see also John L. Austin, How to Do
Things With Words (Oxford: Oxford UP 1962), 51: ‘Just as the purpose of assertion is defeated by an inter-
nal contradiction (in which we assimilate and contrast at once and so stultify the whole procedure), the
purpose of a contract is defeated if we say “I promise and I ought not.”’
78 See John L. Austin, ‘Performative Utterances’, in his Philosophical Papers (first publ. 1961), 2nd end. (Ox-
ford: Oxford UP 1970), 235–6. Nevertheless, the combination of and comparison between John L. Aus-
tin’s ‘performative utterance’ and Jürgen Habermas’ ‘claim to correctness’, see Robert Alexy, A Theory of
Legal Argumentation, trans. Ruth Adler and Neil MacCormick (Oxford: Oxford UP 1989), 107–11.
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so that for the lawgiver or the law-making process on the one hand, it implies a claim to
justice;79 and for the judges or the law-applying process on the other hand, it implies a
claim to justification.80 Therefore, this argument of correctness is analytically necessary
in the strict sense of performative contradiction, which is also admitted by Raz as ‘a
conceptual truth’.81
Since, however, the claim to substantial correctness is just a claim, not correctness it-
self, further steps are required to ensure that this claim to correctness can be sufficiently
justified.82 It is in this context that Alexy introduces two further arguments, i. e. the argu-
ment from injustice, which is a rational reconstruction of the famous ‘Radbruch Formu-
la’,83 as well as the argument from principles, which is adopted and adapted from Josef
Esser, Ronald Dworkin, etc.84 It is thought that through the argument from correctness,
combined with these two additional arguments, that moral elements can be shown to
be necessarily incorporated into the law.85 The problem, however, is that the latter two
arguments are not analytical; rather, they are normative arguments. To this extent, a
purely analytical necessary connection of law and morality, in the strictest logical sense,
still awaits fully adequate analytical arguments.
Still, the landscape of legal non-positivism has been changed as a result of the above
three arguments introduced by Alexy. One is analytical, and the other two are norma-
tive, but they are not empirical. In this sense, we can say Alexy follows intentionally
an anti-naturalistic strategy in order to understand the notion of necessity. First, Alexy
draws a conceptual framework which extends from extreme legal positivism to the most
extreme non-positivistic position.86 But this is not simply a dichotomy of legal posi-
tivism and natural law theories, the latter being committed to the notion (5.i) of blind
necessity. In other words, the non-positivists do not always have to choose the position
of natural law theories, following their supra-naturalistic strategy. Second, law’s claim to
substantial correctness is, according to Alexy, not reducible to a rudimentary claim of
‘appropriateness’, just opposite to Raz’s reading;87 it is irreducible in turn to one of the
two positivist elements, namely authoritative issuance or social efficacy. Third, although
the law analytically necessarily rises the claim to correctness, it only possibly fulfills this
79 See Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 1), at 36–8.
80 Ibid., at 38–9.
81 See Raz, ‘The Argument from Justice, or How Not to Reply to Legal Positivism’ (n. 5), at 326.
82 See Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 1), at 40.
83 Ibid., at 40–68.
84 Ibid., at 68–81.
85 Ibid., at 43–4, 75–81.
86 Ibid., at 26–7.
87 See Raz, ‘The Argument from Justice, or How Not to Reply to Legal Positivism’ (n. 5), at 326–7. The
instant reply from Alexy, see Alexy, ‘An Answer to Joseph Raz’, in Law, Rights and Discourse: The Legal Phi-
losophy of Robert Alexy (n. 5), 49–50. Recently, Ulfrid Neumann also considers Raz’s criticism as wrong
interpretation of Alexy’s argument from correctness, since this argument bases on some institutional
background. See Ulfrid Neumann, ‘Notwendigkeit und Grenzen von Idealisierungen im Rechtsdenken.
Anmerkungen zu Robert Alexys Modell der “Doppelnatur” des Rechts’, in Rechtsphilosophie und Grundre-
chtstheorie. Robert Alexys System (n. 12), at 69–70.
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claim, or it possibly does not. This results in a ‘qualifying’, but never a ‘classifying’, nec-
essary connection between law and morality, so as Alexy describes.88
Moreover, since the notion (5.iii) of ‘objective necessity’ pursued by Kant was and
still is a commonplace notion for most theorists in Continental Europe, including Gus-
tav Radbruch and Robert Alexy, and since it is also a possible goal for the issues being
discussed here, we can no doubt say that the arguments adduced by Alexy are suitable
as a candidate for justifying the objectively necessary connection of law and morality.
2. Contingent Connection between Law and Morality (Austin, Hart, Coleman)
The inclusive legal positivists all acknowledge the contingent connection of law and mo-
rality (‘¬□¬I ˄ ¬□I’), or as Jules L. Coleman puts it, ‘the separability thesis’:
The separability thesis is the claim that there is no necessary connection between law and mo-
rality. …
The separability thesis asserts that it is not the case that morality is necessarily a condition of
legality, whereas the claim with which it is here confused asserts that necessarily morality is
not a condition of legality. To be sure, many positivists defend the latter, stronger claim; it is a
corollary of the sources thesis – the distinctive claim of exclusive legal positivism. However, no
one defends the claim that necessarily morality is not a condition of legality ever confuses it
with the separability thesis.89
It is to be observed that Coleman obviously distinguishes between his ‘inclusive’ posi-
tion of no necessary connection (‘¬□I’) and another ‘exclusive’ position of necessar-
ily no connection (‘□¬I’). Moreover, he grants that ‘the separability thesis’ is a ‘very
weak claim of negative positivism’.90 We can also see that Coleman is inclined to use the
notion (2) of ‘necessary conditions’, but he only mentions the notion (6) of ‘analytic,
necessary, or essential truth’ negatively.91
Along this approach to the ‘separability thesis’, even Hart in his ‘Postscript’ seems to
be convinced of so-called ‘soft positivism’. He writes:
[…] my explicit acknowledgement that the rule of recognition may incorporate as criteria of
legal validity conformity with moral principles or substantive values; so my doctrine is what has
been called ‘soft positivism’ …92
[…] soft positivism, which allows that a criterion of legal validity may be in part a moral test …93
The separability thesis together with the notion of a necessary condition is not, howev-
er, the whole story that the inclusive legal positivists would tell. What is more, Coleman
88 See Alexy, The Argument from Injustice (n. 1), at 26, 36.
89 Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Principle (Oxford: Oxford UP 2001), 151–2 (emphasis original).
90 Jules L. Coleman, ‘Negative and Positive Positivism’, The Journal of Legal Studies, 11 (1982), 163.
91 See Coleman, The Practice of Principle (n. 89), at 63.
92 Hart, The Concept of Law (n. 24), at 250 (emphasis added).
93 Ibid., at 253 (emphasis added).
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always emphasizes another, more essential thesis of legal positivism, i. e. ‘the social facts
thesis’, or as it is specified by Coleman, ‘the conventionality thesis’:
Legal positivism is a general jurisprudence that asserts that morality is not a necessary condition
of legality or that whether there is law, the criteria of legality are conventional.94
Positivism claims that the possibility of legal authority is to be explained not in terms of sub-
stantive morality, but rather in terms of certain social facts. Call this the ‘social fact thesis’; no
claim is more central to legal positivism.95
Like every legal positivist, I maintain that the possibility of law is to be explained in terms of
social facts. Like Hart, I further maintain that the possibility of legal authority is to be explained
in terms of a conventional social practice, namely the adherence by officials to a rule of rec-
ognition that imposes a duty on them to apply all and only those rules valid under it. This is
the conventionality thesis. In explaining the possibility of legal authority in terms of a rule of
recognition, the conventionality thesis gives content to the idea that law is a normative social
practice which, while satisfying the social fact thesis, nevertheless avoids reducing legal author-
ity to social facts.96
It is enlightening to see that Coleman, a leading figure in the legal positivistic tradition,
always mentions the two theses simultaneously. According to him, morality is not a nec-
essary condition of legality, while social facts or the conventional practices among offi-
cials are indeed ‘(conceptually) necessary elements’97 of law.
To this extent, it seems clear that the inclusive legal positivists actually undergo a
naturalistic strategy in order to understand the concept of law, which is found in tan-
dem with a definitely weakened notion (5.ii) of necessity.98 Furthermore, this process of
weakening could be better reflected as follows: (i) the ‘exclusive’ position of necessarily
94 Ibid., at xix (emphasis added).
95 Ibid., at 75.
96 Ibid., at 77 (emphasis original).
97 Ibid., at 84, 98 (emphasis added).
98 I am grateful to Professor Stanley L. Paulson for his illuminating characterization of legal positivism in
relation to ‘positivism writ large’ i. e. naturalism. Taking John Austin’s stance as a very example, Paulson
writes: ‘My first thesis: Austin’s naturalism – his reduction of ostensibly juridico-normative concepts to
matter of fact (namely, to habit) – is, as he contends, sufficient to make out his case on the nature of law.
My second thesis: If Austin’s naturalism has him claiming that every aspect of the law lends itself to re-
specting in factual terms, then it is scarely surprising that he makes no claims respecting a non-contingent
link between the law and morality.’ See Paulson, ‘The Very Idea of Legal Positivism’ (n. 12), at 90 (empha-
sis added).
Meanwhile, he initiates a distinction between legal positivism qua naturalism and legal positivism with-
out naturalism, taking Hans Kelsen as a very example, which is according to him more fundamental as the
distinction between inclusive legal and exclusive legal positivism. See Pauslon, ibid., at 90; also see this
article, Part Three, III. 4. Paulson himself is not inclined, however, to label H. L. A. Hart or even Joseph
Raz as ‘naturalist’. See Paulson, ibid., at 93, 96–7.
These researches by Paulson has surely encouraged me to make my own comments on Jules L. Coleman
and Brian Leiter here, and furthermore to initiate a more comprehensive frame for the contemporary
debates. According to my usage in this article, however, the naturalistic, non-naturalistic and even su-
pra-naturalistic stances are only strategies to understand the notion of necessity as well as the relation
necessary relations of law and morality, rather than a substitution of the basic distinction between legal
non-positivism, inclusive and exclusive legal positivism.
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no connection (‘□¬I’) undergoes a weakening process that yields the ‘inclusive’ posi-
tion of no necessary connection (‘¬□I’), as Coleman himself already grants; (ii) then
the latter is further weakened into the position of no necessary connection on behalf of
the naturalistic understanding of necessity, which, for convenience, may be character-
ized in the following as □w¬I.
Moreover, Coleman’s specific comments on the so-called ‘naturalized jurisprudence’
of Brian Leiter99 also reveal the close relation between the tradition of legal positivism
and that of naturalism-oriented legal theories.
The naturalist is thus in the same boat with every other analytic philosopher of law – his project
requires analytic legal philosophy as much as Raz’ or mine does. … [N]aturalized jurispru-
dence presupposes a positivist conception of how to think about the criteria of legality. …
At best, naturalism is not an alternative but a supplemental element of a positivistic picture of
adjudicatory content […], let alone to analytic legal philosophy generally.100
3. Necessarily No Connection between Law and Morality (Raz)
In our line of argumentation, the exclusive legal positivist is assumed to acknowledge
that there is necessarily no connection between law and morality (‘□¬I’). But the state-
ments by its leading figure, Joseph Raz, are not quite that simple. First, in many para-
graphs in his writings Raz expresses his views in a way similar to other legal positivists:
That the primary organs follow and apply the rules of recognition does not entail that they hold
them to be morally justified. … It is normal to find that some at least of the subjects of an insti-
tutionalized system hold it to be morally justified. … But it is of great importance to remember
that these facts though common and widespread are not logical necessary. Moreover, it is not
only logically possible but also not uncommon for an official of the system to follow his rules of
recognition without regarding them as morally justified.101
Since, according to Raz, it is not logical necessary that the legal rules be morally jus-
tified (‘¬□I’) and it is logically possible that the legal rules are not morally justified
(‘¬□¬(¬I)’), which is equivalent to the former, we can find no difference between him
and other inclusive legal positivists.
Coleman, however, insists that Raz be labelled as an ‘exclusive legal positivist’ when
he argues:
99 See Brian Leiter, ‘Realism, Hard Positivism and Conceptual Analysis’, Legal Theory, 4 (1998), 533–47, repr.
in his Naturalizing Jurisprudence. Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy
(Oxford: Oxford UP 2007), 121–136.
100 See Coleman, The Practice of Principle (n. 89), at 214–6 (emphasis added).
101 Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (first publ. 1975), 2nd edn. (Oxford: Oxford UP 1990), 147–8 (em-
phasis added).
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[T]he debate between exclusive and inclusive legal positivism turns not on the controversiality
of moral criteria of legality, but instead on the question of whether or not such criteria are com-
patible with legal authority. On Raz’ view, the concept of legal authority precludes inquiring
into a law’s justifying (or dependent) reason in order to determine its identity or content.102
It is then the ‘authoritative sources thesis’ of Raz, which would make a difference. Ac-
cording to Joseph Raz, saying that the law undoubtedly has factual authority, presup-
poses that it also lays a claim to legitimate authority,103 which stands in contrast to law’s
claim to substantial correctness, as Robert Alexy argues. A full-fledged comparison be-
tween the two authors will show that, there are significant differences between them,
both in the manner of the problems that arise and in the respective theoretical resources
they have at hand.104
The problem that arises in Raz’s case is how to explain the normativity of law. Ac-
cording to his teacher, Hart, law consists of social rules, which instruct people what to
do and how to do it, so that people usually adopt an internal point of view, i. e. a reflec-
tive and hence normative perspective, to one another’s behavior.105 Belonging to this
tradition, Raz asserts furthermore in his celebrated work Practical Reason and Norms106
that behind all behavior there are more or less diverse reasons. Since reasons motivating
the behavior directly can be called first-order reasons or prima facie reasons, and should
be all considered and balanced before deciding which reason or reasons ought to be fol-
lowed.107 By contrast, norms function as ‘second-order reasons’, i. e. reasons supporting
or standing in the way of the direct reasons mentioned above.108 Since a legal norm does
not only instruct people that they are to behave in compliance with it as their one and
the only reason, but also precludes taking all other reasons into consideration. There-
fore, it is assumed that the legal norms play the role of ‘negative second-order reasons’,
or ‘exclusive reasons’ for action,109 or, as he puts it at some points, legal norms are to be
considered both as first-order and as exclusionary reasons.110 The system of legal norms,
namely the legal system, is not necessarily valid; it is only binding from a point of view.
102 Coleman, The Practice of Principle (n. 89), at 68.
103 See Raz, The Authority of Law (n. 5), at 8–9.
104 There are, of course, researches which compare as well as criticize just specifically on these two kinds of
claims of law with different content considerably, see Neil MacCormick, ‘Why Law Makes No Claims’, in
Law, Rights and Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy (n. 5), 59–67; Gardner, ‘How Law Claims,
What Law Claims’, in Institutionalized Reason. The Jurisprudence of Robert Alexy (n. 12), at 29–44; Paula
Gaido, ‘The Place for Morality in Law. An Exchange between Robert Alexy and Joseph Raz’ (n. 12).
Nevertheless, there are still commentators discussing the two claims in separated context, see Paulson,
‘A “Justified Normativity” Thesis in Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law? Rejoinders to Alexy and Raz’
(n. 12); Neumann, ‘Notwendigkeit und Grenzen von Idealisierungen im Rechtsdenken. Anmerkungen zu
Robert Alexys Modell der “Doppelnatur” des Rechts’, in Rechtsphilosophie und Grundrechtstheorie. Robert
Alexys System (n. 12), at 69–70.
105 See Hart, The Concept of Law (n. 24), at 56–7, 88–90.
106 Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (n. 101).
107 Ibid., at 36–9.
108 Ibid., at 39–40.
109 Ibid., at 142.
110 Ibid., at 144.
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Hence, if the primary organs do not regard themselves as bound to apply a certain norm,
it does not belong to the system.111 The judgments from a point of view are partial and
incomplete, but surely exclusionary:
[T]he judges who judge a man from the legal point of view do not necessarily deny the validity
of other reasons which bear on his action. … In this usage a judgement from a point of view is
merely a partial, incomplete judgement of what ought to be done. …
The judge […] both regards his judgement as based on a partial assessment of the valid reasons
and as justifying action. This means that he regards himself as justified in acting on some rea-
sons to the exclusion of others.112
Raz’s view, as expressed here, seems to be nearer to Alexy’s theory of the law’s claim to
correctness, e. g. the claim to correctness by a judge. They differ from one another, how-
ever, in the objects and the contents that are to be justified. This is clear in connection
with ‘authoritative source thesis’. On the one hand, the law in general consists of direc-
tives, which have been proven by the cognitive and effective sources of authority, inde-
pendent of their contents, values, morality, etc., so as the ‘pre-emptive thesis’ says.113 On
the other hand, the law cannot be separated from moral elements, for the reason that the
claim to legitimate authority is always a moral claim, in so far as it requires a so-called
normal justification. This is the ‘normal justification thesis’.114 Through this device, Raz is
seen to stand at some distance from both non-positivists and inclusive legal positivists.
All these complexities result, at least in an essential part, from the ambiguous notion of
necessity as such.
Raz seems, however, to have only a weak concept of legal authority:
It should be remembered that this test [of claiming authority to regulate – emphasis added] sets
at most a necessary condition and not sufficient condition for a system to be a legal system. …
Once again this condition [of claiming authority to be supreme – emphasis added] is a weak
one …115
Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that even Raz follows the above two steps
of the ‘weakening process’, namely, asserting no necessary connection and adopting a
weakened notion (5.ii) of necessity itself. Nevertheless, we should not neglect Raz’s ex-
pressions of ‘human necessity’ in contrast to that of ‘logical necessity’, when he discuss-
es the possibility of a sanctionless legal system:
It cannot be denied that all known legal systems are based on widespread resort to sanctions and
that all of them rely ultimately on the use of force. … First, all known legal systems prohibit the
use of force against the officials of the system when those are engaged in their official duties.
Secondly, they all authorized the use of force to enforce compliance with sanctions. … Perhaps
111 Ibid., at 142.
112 Ibid., at 143–4.
113 See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986), 46.
114 Ibid., at 53.
115 See Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (n. 101), at 151–2.
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there is a third feature: all known legal systems provide for sanctions for intentional violation
of all legal rules addressed to ordinary individuals. … Our three generalizations allow for the
existence of mandatory norms addressed to officials which are backed by sanctions, but more
important still they are empirical generalizations true of known legal systems. They do not represent
a logical feature of our concept of law. …
… Is it possible for there to be a legal system in force which does not provide for sanctions or
which does not authorize their enforcement by force? The answer seems to be that it is humanly
impossible but logical possible.116
That a sanctionless legal system is logical possible (‘¬□¬(¬S)’), is equivalent to the no-
tion that a sanction-based legal system is not logically necessary (‘¬□S’). And the idea
that a sanctionless legal system is humanly impossible (‘□w¬(¬S)’) is equivalent to the
notion that a sanction-based legal system is humanly necessary (‘□wS’). That is to say,
the notion (6) of logical necessity becomes irrelevant, while the notion of ‘human ne-
cessity’ proves to be of great significance in Raz’s view. This ‘human necessity’ is better
understood in terms of the ‘empirical generalizations true of known legal systems’. This
understanding is inevitably naturalism-oriented, when he further asserts:
I suggested three generalizations concerning the minimum regulation of force and sanctions.
… The necessity referred to is factual not logical necessity. These are not part of the identifying
features of law. They are features which a legal system must have if it is to enjoy enduring exist-
ence in human society.117
Now we can surely say, here, that the notion of necessity is definitely weakened in the
legal positivistic tradition.
4. Excursus: Necessarily No Connection between Law and Morality (Kelsen)
One may wonder whether there is any exception to the weakened necessary separation
thesis in the legal positivistic traditions. In this connection there arises the case of the
so-called ‘Pure Theory of Law’ introduced by Hans Kelsen.118 This is not the place for
close scrutiny of every detail of his theory, but we can establish that Kelsen, as a leading
figure in the legal positivistic tradition, intentionally follows an anti-naturalistic strategy
in understanding the law, what many writers describe as a strategy of ‘normativism’.119
116 Ibid., at 158 (emphasis added).
117 Ibid., at 168–9 (emphasis added).
118 See Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre. Einleirung in die rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik, 1st edn. (Leipzig
and Vienna: Franz Deuticke 1934); repr. as Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre. Studienausgabe der 1. Auflage
1934, ed. Matthias Jestaedt (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2008); and its translation in English, see Hans Kels-
en, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory, trans. Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson
(Oxford: Clarendon Press 1992).
119 See Stanley L. Paulson, ‘Introduction. On Kelsen’s Place in Jurisprudence’, in Hans Kelsen, Introduction
to the Problems of Legal Theory (n. 118), at xviii; and his ‘Der Normativismus Hans Kelsens’, Juristenzeitung
61 (2006), 529–80; also see Riccardo Guastini, ‘Normativism or the Normative Theory of Legal Science:
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A normativist may, on the one hand, as in Kelsen’s own case, have the notion (5.ii) of
natural necessity or causality, which is still naturalistically oriented. On the other hand,
this naturalistic notion (5.ii) of necessity is not relevant to the normativist theorist’s
understanding of law and its relation to morality. What counts, however, is the so-called
‘imputation’ of legal consequence to legal condition. The core paragraphs by Kelsen, in
his early period, goes as follows:
Just as laws of nature (Naturgesetz) link a certain material fact as cause with another as effect,
so positive laws (Rechtsgesetz) link legal condition with legal consequence (the consequence of
a so-called unlawful act). If the mode of linking material facts is causality in the one case, it is
imputation in the other, and imputation (Zurechnung) is recognized in the Pure Theory of Law
as the particular lawfulness, the autonomy, of the law (besondere Gesetzlichkeit des Rechts). …
The connection of the punishment to the delict, of the execution of the lien to the material fact
of unlawful civil act, has normative import (normative Bedeutung), not causal import. … ‘[O]
ught’ (Sollen) expresses the unique sense in which the material facts belonging to the system of
the law are posited in their reciprocal relation. In the same way, ‘must’ (Müssen) expresses the
law of causality.120
Whether it is still proper to use ‘necessity’ or ‘must’ in the case of ‘imputation’ as an al-
ternative to natural causation, is the crucial problem. It is in this context that Stanley L.
Paulson understands Kelsen as he ‘wishes to underscore a law-like, necessary or nomo-
logical relation in the law running parallel to the law-like, necessary or nomological rela-
tion manifest in causality.’121 I will not try, however, to use either notion of ‘necessity’ to
describe the normative relation between material facts, which is determined by norms.
Verbally Kelsen thinks about something parallel to the notion (5.ii) of necessity, but it
is still law-like. In other words, Kelsen is never willing to use the notions of necessity or
lack of necessity in order to describe legal norms, but with the concept of ‘imputation’.
Moreover, it is through this normativistic understanding of law that Kelsen main-
tains the full separation between law and morality, as he writes:
The Pure Theory of Law seeks to free the conceptual characterization of the law from this ideo-
logical element by completely severing the concept of the legal norm from its source, the con-
cept of the moral norm, and by securing the autonomy of the law even vis-à-vis the moral law.
The Pure Theory does this not by understanding the legal norm, like the moral norm, as an
Some Epistemological Problems’, in Normativity and Norms: Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes, ed.
Stanly L. Paulson and Bonnie Litschewski Paulson (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998), 317–30; and Matthias
Jestaedt, ‘Hans Kelsens Reine Rechtslehre. Eine Einführung’, in Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre. Studien-
ausgabe der 1. Auflage 1934 (n. 118), xxx–xxxiii: ‘normativistic positivism’ or ‘normativism without (legal)
moralism and positivism without (legal) naturalism’.
120 See Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre. Studienausgabe der 1. Auflage 1934 (n. 118), at 34; and its translation in Eng-
lish, see Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (n. 118), at 23–4 (original texts and emphasis
added).
121 See Paulson, ‘The Very Idea of Legal Positivism’ (n. 12), at 99 (emphasis added).
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imperative […], but by understanding the legal norm as a hypothetical judgment that expresses
the specific linking of a conditioning material fact with a conditioned consequence.122
One can surely consider further that Kelsen declares such a strict cleavage between law
and morality that he meets, in this sense, the requirement of the strictest ‘necessarily no
connection thesis’. In other places, however, Kelsen may well admit ‘not [to] exclude the
possibility of the claim that the formation of positive law ought to conform to other moral
system – and possibly in fact conforms to it – while it contradicts still another different
moral system.’123 This would lead one to consider Kelsen as an inclusive legal positivist.124
But the similar ambiguity occurs also in the case of Joseph Raz, as stated above, and
since Kelsen insists nothing other than that ‘the definition of law does not include the
element of moral content’,125 his position is still exclusive.
Still, following the normativistic strategy, the notion (5.ii) of necessity is no longer
relevant for his understanding of law. The separation between law and morality is not a
naturalistic, but a normativistic methodological requirement. This normativistic under-
standing is one kind of anti-naturalistic strategies. In other words, for understanding the
concept of law and its relation to morality, normativism is not only contrary to, but also
an alternative to, naturalism. In this sense, we can characterize Kelsen’s position only
roughly as that there is necessarily, anti-naturalistically or normativistically understood,
no connection between law and morality.
122 See Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre. Studienausgabe der 1. Auflage 1934 (n. 118), at 33–4; and its translation in
English, see Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (n. 118), at 23 (original texts and emphasis
added).
123 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre (first publ. Leipzig and Vienna: Franz Deuticke 1934), 2nd completely new
revised and expanded edn. (Vienna: Deuticke 1960), 68; and its translation in English, see Hans Kelsen,
Pure Thoery of Law, trans. Max Knight (Berkeley: University of California Press 1960), 66 (emphasis add-
ed). (For the reader’s convenience, I have included citations throughout to the English edition of Pure
Theory of Law; the quotations themselves, however, are newly translated by myself.)
Another related paragraph would be quoted here: ‘[T]he question of the relationship of law and moral-
ity … has two meanings: One, what is the relationship between the two? The other, what ought it to be?
If both questions are intermingled, misunderstanding result. The first question is sometimes answered
by saying that law by its very nature is moral … The question is also answered, however, by stating that
the law may, but need not, be moral …’ see Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd edn. ibid., at 65; and its
translation in English, see Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, ibid., at 63 (emphasis original).
124 I am grateful to Professor Robert Alexy for indicating that Hans Kelsen might be an inclusive legal posi-
tivist, who would admit the ‘contingent connection thesis’.
125 Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd edn. (n. 123), at 68; and its translation in English, see Kelsen, Pure Theory of
Law (n. 123), at 66.
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The variety of positions and strategies, along with typical writers, may be illustrated
as follows:
logical relation of
law and morality
notion of necessity
necessary
connection
contingent
connection
necessarily no
connection
supra-naturalistic strategy
natural law
theorists
vacant vacant
naturalistic strategy vacant
Austin; Hart;
Coleman
Raz
anti-naturalistic strategy Radbruch; Alexy vacant Kelsen
Concluding Remark
So far, it can be concluded that:
I. All the theories in the legal positivistic tradition share the ‘separation thesis’, while
all the theories in the legal non-positivistic tradition share the ‘connection thesis’.
II. In the sense of the strictest, analytical necessity, there are three and only three
logical possible positions concerning the relation of law and morality, i. e. legal
non-positivism, insisting on the ‘necessary connection thesis’, exclusive legal posi-
tivism, claiming the ‘necessary separation thesis’, and inclusive legal positivism, re-
lying on the ‘contingent connection thesis’. These three positions together exhaust
the logically possible relations of law and morality. The logical relations between
any two of these three positions are contrary, that is to say, as contraries the two
members of each pair cannot be both true, although they can both be false. There-
fore, one can present only one of the three positions as a focus of one’s justification.
By the same token, in order to justify one’s own position, it is well that the other
two positions be shown to be indefensible.
III. The notion of necessity, however, varies and can be depicted in six groups: (1) coer-
cive necessity; (2) necessary condition; (3) predestinate necessity; (4) teleological
necessity; (5) natural necessity, which can be further classified into three groups:
(i) blind natural necessity, (ii) subjective natural necessity, (iii) objective natural
necessity; and (6) analytical necessity. Moreover, the understanding of natural ne-
cessity can follow either supra-naturalistic, naturalistic, or anti-naturalistic strate-
gies.
IV. To justify the necessary connection between law and morality, theorists can follow
either a supra-naturalistic strategy (i. e. natural law theories) or an anti-naturalis-
tic strategy (i. e. legal non-positivism). For the latter, however, it remains difficult
to confine one’s case to analytical arguments alone (e. g. Robert Alexy’s argument
from correctness).
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V. To insist on the contingent connection between law and morality, the inclusive
legal positivists may undergo a naturalistic strategy for his understanding of the
concept of law, which is in tandem with a definitely weakened notion (5.ii) of ne-
cessity (e. g. Coleman’s conventionalism thesis).
VI . To assert that there is necessarily no connection between law and morality, the ex-
clusive legal positivists could follow either a naturalistic strategy (e. g. Joseph Raz’s
authoritative sources thesis) or a normativistic strategy (e. g. Hans Kelsen’s pure
theory of law).
VII. Alexy’s argument from law’s claim to correctness is a strict analytical argument, but
it still requires support by appeal to other normative arguments, in order thereby
to arrive at the non-positivistic thesis of necessary connection between law and
morality. While Raz’s authoritative sources thesis is only a normative argument,
since it does not reflect logico-analytical themes but, rather, politico-philosophical
themes. Hence this thesis can hardly justify the exclusive positivistic thesis of nec-
essarily no connection between law and morality. Since the notion of necessity in
the legal positivistic tradition is definitely a weakened one, it cannot be justified in
strictly logical sense.
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